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Contractual and Covenantal
Conceptions of Modern Treaty
Interpretation
Dwight Newman*
I. INTRODUCTION
After a long period of inactivity on treaty negotiations with Canada’s
Aboriginal communities, the 1975 James Bay and Northern Québec
Agreement marked the start of a new phase of treaty negotiation, and the
1998 Nisga’a Agreement launched this new phase’s intensification, as the
latter was to be followed by numerous others taking on a similar form.1
Both judicial and constitutional pressure played a significant part in
fostering this modern phase of Aboriginal treaty-making. The 1973
Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) decision2 of the Supreme
Court of Canada announced that the game was up on any future denials
of the legal standing of Aboriginal title, the 1982 constitutional amendments established that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed,”3 and the
1990s case law of the Supreme Court of Canada began simultaneously to
give full-fledged legal force to these rights and to urge negotiations

*
Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan. I thank for their helpful comments on a
prior form of this article Ben Berger, Julie Jai, Kent McNeil, Bruce Ryder, Ria Tzimas, Kerry
Wilkins and other participants at the session of the Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference 2011
at which it was presented.
1
On the history of Canadian Aboriginal treaties, see generally J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009)
[hereinafter “Miller”]. On the Nisga’a Agreement, see also Tom Molloy, The World is Our Witness:
The Historic Journey of the Nisga’a Into Canada (Calgary: Fifth House, 2000); Sari M. Graben,
“The Nisga’a Final Agreement: Negotiating Federalism” (2007) 6 Indigenous L.J. 63.
2
[1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Calder”].
3
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,
s. 35(1).
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of outstanding issues.4 The latter stance was arguably further supported
through the duty to consult doctrine that carries on the aspiration to
negotiated reconciliation.5
Only in 2010 has the Supreme Court of Canada become directly engaged with the interpretation of these modern Aboriginal treaties. Its
engagement comes in a blockbuster pair of cases that divided the Court.
These cases were keenly anticipated, with some having written of them
previously as an upcoming opportunity for the Court to define the
principles of modern treaty interpretation.6 These two cases were both
complex and interlayered with a number of different issues, so it is worth
briefly situating the differences in them slightly more broadly.
In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses,7 the Court split 5-4 on interpretation of parts of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement
(“JBNQA”) in the context of a dispute about the application of federal
environmental assessment processes after the forms of participative
environmental assessment negotiated in the JBNQA. Justice Binnie’s
majority judgment concluded that the JBNQA did not oust federal
jurisdiction. In dissent, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. held that the specific
terms of the JBNQA had deliberately created one assessment process that
would embody environmental and participatory aspects, with specific
terms of the Agreement then precluding the other level of government
from applying additional processes.
In Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation,8 the Court considered whether an ongoing duty to consult applied to the Crown in the
context of arguments that the 1997 Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation
Agreement excluded this requirement. This case featured a pair of judges
fracturing off from the rest of the Court with a perspective and language
4
See also generally Dwight G. Newman, “Negotiated Rights Enforcement” (2006) 69
Sask. L. Rev. 119 (examining the phenomenon of seeking to have certain rights implemented
through negotiation, and resulting implications).
5
See Dwight Newman, “Institutional Roles and Chief Justice Lamer’s Aboriginal Rights
Jurisprudence” (2009) 46 S.C.L.R. (2d) 77. See also Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal
Council, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, at para. 38 (S.C.C.): “As the post-Haida Nation
case law confirms, consultation is ‘[c]oncerned with an ethic of ongoing relationships’ and seeks to
further an ongoing process of reconciliation by articulating a preference for remedies ‘that promote
ongoing negotiations’: D.G. Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal
Peoples (2009), at p. 21.”
6
See especially Julie Jai, “The Interpretation of Modern Treaties and the Honour of the
Crown: Why Modern Treaties Deserve Judicial Deference” (2009) 26 N.J.C.L. 25 [hereinafter
“Jai”].
7
[2010] S.C.J. No. 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moses”].
8
[2010] S.C.J. No. 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Salmon”].
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rarely seen in recent Aboriginal rights cases, but, as I will discuss,
continuous with the Moses decision itself. Justice Binnie wrote for seven
judges in holding that the duty to consult is a constitutional requirement
that cannot be contracted away but that the terms of the Agreement
shaped the implications of the duty to consult on the particular facts,
such that it had been met with even limited steps. In her concurring
judgment, Deschamps J. held that the Agreement in question had in fact
addressed and defined consultation requirements and would prevail over
the duty to consult existing outside the treaty. How, one might ask, did
the judges fracture so significantly in these two cases? Much came down
to nuances of interpretation of the modern treaties.
Although a number of different matters were at stake, the development to note in these two cases on the issue at hand is the adoption of a
different attitude to and philosophy of Aboriginal treaty interpretation in
the context of modern Aboriginal treaties. This attitude stems from a
different form of and background to these treaties, and, in Part II, I will
argue that although the judges split over some matters in these cases,
there is actually a remarkable degree of agreement amongst the different
judges on the different principles applicable to modern treaty interpretation. I will suggest that the judges on both sides of the splits affirm a
strong adherence to the text of modern treaties, albeit with the shared aim
of interpreting them to achieve certain purposes. The judges actually
adopt the implicit analogy with contractual interpretation. In Part III, I
will seek to show in more general terms how interpretation can take on a
more contractual conception or what I will call a more “covenantal”
conception of the nature of treaties.9 In Part IV, I will raise concerns that
the dominant thrust of these recent cases toward the contractual approach
may well carry other very significant consequences that may yet enter
into Aboriginal law in unanticipated ways. In Part V, however, I will
introduce a counterpoint to the triumph of contractual interpretation,
arguing that some fragments of the reasoning in these cases leave alive
the possibility of more covenantal readings of even the modern treaties,
with the jurisprudence to this point thus continuing to straddle different
possibilities and to leave open different futures that will continue to be
defined by the courts, by the parties, and by Canadians more generally.
9
As I will discuss below, the term is one designed to embrace sacred dimensions of treatymaking. To be clear, there is no connection intended to the contract-related concept of a “restrictive
covenant”.
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II. PRINCIPLES OF MODERN TREATY INTERPRETATION
The key doctrinal point to note is that the Court defines in the recent
cases a clear set of lines between historical treaty interpretation and
modern treaty interpretation. This is apparent right from the outset in
Moses, with Binnie J. specifically distinguishing the task at hand from
that in past case law on the interpretation of historical treaties, and
several features of his five-judge majority judgment in Moses notably set
the tone for the other judgments. Distinguishing the context in Moses,
involving an interpretation of a provision of the JBNQA, from the
Court’s 1996 decision in R. v. Badger,10 Binnie J. writes that:
[a]t issue in that case was an 1899 treaty. The contract analogy is even
more apt in relation to a modern comprehensive treaty whose terms
(unlike in 1899) are not constituted by an exchange of verbal promises
reduced to writing in a language many of the Aboriginal signatories did
not understand ... The text of modern comprehensive treaties is
meticulously negotiated by well-resourced parties.11

One key result of this distinction is a strong adherence to the text of the
modern treaty, with Binnie J. going on to emphasize “[t]he importance
and complexity of the actual text” as a distinguishing factor in the
context of the modern treaties and thus something to be prioritized in
interpretation.12
Several features of Binnie J.’s emphasis on the actual text mark differences from the Court’s approach to interpretation in past cases in the
context of historical treaties. First, the emphasis now is on the text rather
than on any external promises that may have been given orally. Past case
law on historical treaties has responded to a different context in which
“[t]he treaties, as written documents, recorded an agreement that had
already been reached orally and they did not always record the full extent
of the oral agreement,”13 with the result that the words of the treaty were
less significant and accompanying oral promises could be very significant in interpretation of the treaty.14 Second, the emphasis is on a reading
10

[1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badger”].
Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 7.
12
Id.
13
Badger, supra, note 10, at para. 52.
14
Id., at paras. 55-58. See also R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at
para. 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall No. 1”]; Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada,
[2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222, at para. 56 (S.C.C.).
11
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of the treaty provisions’ natural legal effect rather than on particular
techniques of construction in favour of the Aboriginal treaty-making
partner as had been present in the past jurisprudence on historical
treaties. Past interpretation of historical treaties was premised, at least in
theory, on the famous Nowegijick principle that “treaties and statutes
relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions
resolved in favour of the Indians.”15 This principle was reaffirmed in
Badger, where Cory J. wrote that “any ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the wording of the treaty or document must be resolved in favour
of the Indians. A corollary to this principle is that any limitations which
restrict the rights of Indians under treaties must be narrowly construed.”16
Third — and on a matter to which I will return in Part III — Binnie J.’s
language now adheres to analogies to contract interpretation, which
Binnie J. specifically accepts and calls “even more apt” than in historical
contexts.17 This adoption of contractual language contrasts with Binnie
J.’s prior shrinking from such language in Marshall (No. 1), where he
wrote of a treaty provision that “[t]his was not a commercial contract”18
and adopted interpretive techniques as far removed from the contractual
as possible.
One might initially be inclined to read Moses as dividing the judges
based on whether they would look to considerations apart from the text
itself, with Binnie J.’s majority judgment then almost seeming like a
majority in favour of simple textual construction and the dissent of LeBel
and Deschamps JJ. then being a strong note in favour of ongoing
purposive interpretation of treaties. However, to perceive matters in this
way would be a mistake in several ways. First, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
are fully in accord with Binnie J.’s emphasis on the text of modern
treaties. They agree with distinguishing modern treaties from historical
treaties, stating that “[t]he Agreement is far more comprehensive in
scope than either the treaties of peace and friendship or the numbered
treaties considered by this Court in a number of cases in which the
analytical framework for interpreting the historical treaties between
15

R. v. Nowegijick, [1983] S.C.J. No. 5, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, at 36 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Nowegijick”].
16
Badger, supra, note 10, at para. 41. Consider also the acceptance of the principle that
treaties would not freeze rights, even if they constrained them to those constituting logical evolutions
of treaty rights: R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.).
17
Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 7.
18
Marshall No. 1, supra, note 14, at para. 52.
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certain First Nations, Canada and Great Britain was developed.”19 It is
not insignificant to their approach that “all parties to the Agreement were
represented by counsel, and the result of the negotiations was set out in
detail in a 450-page legal document.”20 Indeed, they are even in accord
with the contract analogies, stating that “[t]he Agreement settles the
parties’ mutual rights and obligations, and is clearly binding on the
parties in the same way as any ordinary private law contract would be.”21
There is, to be sure, a slightly broader contextual tone to the dissenting judgment. Justices LeBel and Deschamps even quote at some length
past statements on treaty interpretation from the historical context.22
They affirm a past statement by McLachlin J. (as she then was) oriented
against simple categories of treaties, accepting that it would be best to
avoid any practice of “slotting treaties into different interpretive categories”.23 However, they nonetheless see modern treaties as having been
developed in carefully developed forms and, for instance, specifically
reject the Nowegijick principle in the modern treaty context.24
Justices LeBel and Deschamps thus arrive at a principle of modern
treaty interpretation phrased this way:
When interpreting a modern treaty, a court should strive for an
interpretation that is reasonable, yet consistent with the parties’
intentions and the overall context, including the legal context, of the
negotiations. Any interpretation should presume good faith on the part
of all parties and be consistent with the honour of the Crown. Any
ambiguity that arises should be resolved with these factors in mind.25

Although their interpretive approach refers explicitly to intention and
reasonable interpretation, thus freeing the way for them to examine some
of the practicalities of the issue at play, this element is not actually absent
from Binnie J.’s approach. Justice Binnie tests his textual reading against
broader consequences in the very same paragraph where he refers to the

19

Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 98.
Id., at para. 118. Cf. Little Salmon, supra, note 8, at para. 54 (Binnie J. stating that
“[t]oday’s modern treaty will become tomorrow’s historic treaty. The distinction lies in the relative
precision and sophistication of the modern document.”).
21
Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 92.
22
Id., at para. 107, quoting nine principles from Marshall No. 1, supra, note 14, at para. 78
(dissenting judgment of McLachlin J., as she then was).
23
Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 114, quoting from Marshall No. 1, supra, note 14, at para. 80.
24
Moses, id.
25
Id., at para. 118.
20
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skilled drafting of the text and urges respect for the text as agreed.26 He
also considers his reading against broader constitutional considerations,
seemingly finding support for his textual approach in its adherence to
broader presumptions.27 His discussion of text is simultaneously about
practical implications.28
There is every reason to think that both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Moses adopt an interpretive approach geared to attend
particularly to a closely negotiated text and to sensible readings of it that
fit with the intentions that can reasonably be ascribed to it. Such an
approach to interpretation is of course in keeping with that in other areas
of law, with a careful balance of textual identification of subjective
purpose and testing against objective purpose,29 in place of special
considerations as had been applied in the historical treaty interpretation
context.
Similar principles animate the analysis in the Beckman v. Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation judgments. In this case, Binnie J. writes
for seven judges and again emphasizes that “[u]nlike their historical
counterparts, the modern comprehensive treaty is the product of lengthy
negotiations between well-resourced and sophisticated parties.”30 The
result is that the first resort in determining consultation obligations
related to the treaty is the text of the treaty itself:
When a modern treaty has been concluded, the first step is to look at its
provisions and try to determine the parties’ respective obligations, and
whether there is some form of consultation provided for in the treaty
itself. If a process of consultation has been established in the treaty, the
scope of the duty to consult will be shaped by its provisions.31

Although for the majority the duty to consult can continue to operate
as a parameter outside the treaty if there are areas in which the treaty
leaves differences of interpretation,32 the text of a detailed treaty will
nonetheless take priority in defining when the duty to consult applies.

26

Id., at para. 12.
Id., at para. 13.
28
See, e.g., id., at para. 51.
29
For a broad account of interpretation of legal texts in similar terms, see Aharon Barak,
Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) [hereinafter “Barak”].
30
Little Salmon, supra, note 8, at para. 9.
31
Id., at para. 67.
32
Id., at paras. 62, 69.
27
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In a separate opinion in the case, Deschamps J. (with the agreement
of LeBel J., her duet partner in Moses) is even firmer on the relevance of
the text, suggesting that the addition of any further obligations apart from
those contained in the treaties would be counter to the very purpose of a
treaty:
The Crown’s exercise of its rights under the treaty is subject to
provisions on consultation. To add a further duty to consult to these
provisions would be to defeat the very purpose of negotiating a treaty.
Such an approach would be a step backward that would undermine both
the parties’ mutual undertakings and the objective of reconciliation
through negotiation. This would jeopardize the negotiation processes
currently under way across the country.33

Although Deschamps J. considers her reasons for her concurring opinion
“very different” from those of Binnie J.,34 both judgments are again
attentive to text as a dominant feature in modern treaty interpretation.
That said, there is a very different tone present in the judgment of
Deschamps J., as she characterizes the Aboriginal community litigating
in the case as “reneg[ing] unilaterally on its constitutional undertaking”
in a manner that “could result in a paternalistic legal contempt, compromise the national treaty negotiation process and frustrate the ultimate
objective of reconciliation”.35 The language of “reneging” has not
typically been used to describe the conduct of Aboriginal treaty partners.
In fairness, it should be said that this language is not different than that of
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. in Moses, where they suggested that the
federal government was “unilaterally reneg[ing] on its own solemn
promises”.36 Justices LeBel and Deschamps, even more explicitly than
Binnie J., see the agreement contained within a treaty as especially
important to uphold for broader consequentialist reasons associated with
the treaty negotiation and reconciliation process. And the prospect of a
party reneging is so disturbing to this process that the word appears
repeatedly in Deschamps J.’s discussion in Little Salmon, the prospect
undermining all possibilities of treaties furthering reconciliation.37
The concurring reasons in Little Salmon actually go on to discuss the
significance of legal certainty for Aboriginal parties and to question
33
34
35
36
37

Id., at para. 91.
Id.
Id., at para. 107.
Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 58.
Little Salmon, supra, note 8, at paras. 107, 109, 111, 112.
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suggestions that any relational understanding of treaties leads anywhere
else.38 As Deschamps J. goes on to state, “[h]aving laboured so hard, in
their common interest, to substitute a well-defined legal system for an
uncertain normative system, both the Aboriginal party and the Crown
party have an interest in seeing their efforts bear fruit.”39
There are, to be sure, genuine differences between Binnie J.’s positions and those of LeBel and Deschamps JJ. in these cases on various
matters, including on treaty interpretation. But emphasizing and exaggerating these differences would distract from the dominant commonality
whereby all the judges have come to agreement that modern treaties are
to be approached in a manner suited to their detailed negotiated text, that
approaching them with deep attention to text is the primary means of
interpreting them to achieve their purposes, and that failing to approach
them in this way undermines processes of reconciliation underway in
various ongoing negotiations. Modern treaty interpretation is fundamentally different from the approaches the Court has taken to historical treaty
interpretation.

III. DISTINGUISHING CONTRACTUAL AND COVENANTAL
CONCEPTIONS OF TREATIES
The distinction between modern and historical treaties might be
thought to simply instantiate the broader principle that different types of
texts generally or legal texts specifically are subject to different types of
interpretation (or at least to different emphases even within shared
purposive approaches).40 However, at the same time, some of the
language within the recent judgments draws analogies between modern
treaty interpretation and other kinds of interpretation, with the references
to contractual interpretation being perhaps the most striking.41 The idea
of referring to contractual interpretation in this context is not unprecedented. To take just one example, the decision on historical treaty interpretation in Badger referred briefly to contracts, stating that “[t]reaties are
analogous to contracts, albeit of a very solemn and special, public na38

Id., at paras. 110-111.
Id., at para. 112.
40
Cf., generally Barak, supra, note 29.
41
To say this much is not, of course, to deny the general analogies between various kinds of
interpretation: see, e.g., id.
39
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ture.”42 And, indeed, Julie Jai has explicitly argued for the appropriateness
of using contractual interpretation principles in the context of modern
treaties, arguing, first, that such principles are appropriate in this context43
and, second, that it would even be appropriate to adopt specific principles
from the contract law context. She writes, “[i]t is possible that other canons
of construction from either contract or statutory interpretation such as
contra proferentem and espressio [sic] unius may also be applied in an
appropriate case to assist in resolving a treaty interpretation dispute.”44
However, just what the application of contract-like principles will mean
in the modern treaty context is considerably more complex than may first
appear and, indeed, may have very significant implications that could be
of greater concern than first suspected.
Additional complexity presents itself swiftly. A reference to contractual interpretation will potentially carry different connotations for
different judges, notably as between those from common law and civilian
backgrounds. Although there may be congruence between elements of
the ways in which common law and civil law traditions approach
contractual interpretation, there are at the same time key differences in
respect of the role in contractual interpretation for something like
reasonable expectations.45 Justice Binnie, as compared to LeBel and
Deschamps JJ., might then have conceived of the significance of contractual analogies differently.46
At the interstices of legal traditions, treaty interpretation evokes different kinds of possible analogies. The contractual analogy is of course
not the sole possible analogy, and perhaps not even the most intuitive
analogy. Indeed, although Julie Jai’s recent argument has explicitly called
for the use of contractual analogies on modern treaties,47 Aboriginal law
scholars have generally eschewed such an analogy (although their
condemnations of it have admittedly typically flowed in the context of
42

Badger, supra, note 10, at para. 76.
Jai, supra, note 6, at 56.
Id., at 59.
45
For an important recent discussion, see Sébastien Grammond, “Reasonable Expectations
and the Interpretation of Contracts Across Legal Traditions” (2010) 48 C.B.L.J. 345. For another
recent statement on other differences, see also Catherine Valcke, “Contractual Interpretation at
Common Law and Civil Law: An Exercise in Comparative Legal Rhetoric”, in Jason W. Neyers,
Richard Bronaugh & Stephen G.A. Pitel, eds., Exploring Contract Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2009) 77.
46
And, of course, contractual interpretation might be different yet again within indigenous
legal traditions, if all of the communities involved are seen as important!
47
Jai, supra, note 6, at 56.
43
44
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historical treaties).48 They have preferred to think of treaties as constitutional accords,49 agreements embodying the honour of the Crown,50
agreements sharing jurisdiction in a manner analogous to federalism,51 or
indeed components of the constitution of the modern Canadian state.52
An alternative conception of treaties, applicable to modern treaties as
much as historic ones, is as what I will call “covenants” establishing or
shaping relationships between peoples or communities, or embodying
what Jim Miller has recently described as “foundational documents
establishing the bases of relations between indigenous and immigrant
peoples”.53 Miller uses the term “covenant” in the title of his book on the
history of Aboriginal treaty-making,54 presumably drawing the term in
part from the historical Covenant Chain alliance in Iroquioa55 but also
including it in a list of terms for agreements as a term referencing an
agreement with some form of sacred character. My intent in using the
term is indeed partly to refer to a sacred or spiritual character that many
First Nations consider present in the treaties,56 with the relationships that
treaties embody not being based just on positivist law but also on the
requirements of morality as between communities.57 To think of treaties
as “covenants” is to think of them in a manner building on a series of
other scholarly conceptions while also acknowledging the spiritual views
of Aboriginal communities as a perspective held by some treaty partners
and ultimately thinking of treaties as agreements about foundational

48
See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 140-44.
49
Id., at 151-56.
50
J. Timothy S. McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and Its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal
Peoples (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008), at 75-84.
51
James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism” (1994) 58
Sask. L. Rev. 241.
52
Gordon Christie, “Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation” (2000) 26 Queen’s L.J.
143. See also generally James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties”
(1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 46.
53
Miller, supra, note 1, at 300.
54
Id.
55
Id., at 49ff.
56
See, e.g., John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), at 25.
57
See, e.g., id., at 24-28. The requirements of morality as between communities are of
course complex. I comment on some aspects of them in Dwight Newman, Community and Collective
Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
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relationships between communities that have a fundamentally moral
character to them.58
A covenantal conceptualization of treaties would essentially see them
as agreements between political communities expressing the terms of the
ongoing evolution of relationships between those communities. To see
them as such does not mean ignoring their express terms. Nonetheless, a
covenant, in this sense, differs from a contract in several key ways. It
concerns the establishment of the terms of a long-term relationship rather
than a deal over more specifically defined matters. It has a broad,
typically non-commercial orientation rather than a narrow, typically
commercial purpose. It recognizes the intrinsic value of the other party
rather than having a fundamentally instrumentalist orientation. The
preferred remedial approaches in the case of faltering by a party will
resemble more those of the duty to consult than damages claims after socalled “efficient breaches”.59 To borrow Robert Cover’s famous term, a
covenant offers a “jurisgenesis” of a new normative intersocietal relation.60 An overly stringent contractual approach, taking it at its harshest
possibilities, runs the alternative risk of “juricide” and the presumed
contracting away of legal orders.61
A covenantal conception of treaties would make room for the argument by the Aboriginal parties in the context of the recent judgments,
especially in the context of the Little Salmon case, in which their counsel
58
The term “covenant” obviously has specific referents within Judeo-Christian traditions
that are not those adopted here. Similarly, Sákéj Henderson has used the term as the Englishlanguage translation of certain gifts from the Creator to First Nations (James Youngblood
Henderson, First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights: Defining the Just Society
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2006), at 129-34), which again are not
the specific referent here. Although the term has specific referents in particular communities’
contexts, it has also functioned as a broader term to describe foundational political agreements in
various contexts. See, e.g., the four-part series of Daniel J. Elazar on the covenant tradition in
politics, particularly the fourth volume, Covenant and Civil Society: The Constitutional Matrix of
Modern Democracy (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999). It bears noting that the attempt
to describe fundamental constitutional relationships has not infrequently had to draw on metaphors
from religious and spiritual traditions, such as in recent talk of “reconciliation” and in conceptions of
“subsidiarity”.
59
There are of course differing views on the doctrine of “efficient breach” in the contract
context: for a classic statement more critical of efficient breach, see, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
60
Robert M. Cover, “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, at 11.
61
To address a possible counterargument here, the covenantal conception is more attuned to
maintaining plural legal systems, whereas the contractual approach will in some instances be attuned
specifically to wiping out some legal norms. There is not, as one reviewer put it, “the same amount
of law” on both conceptions.
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argued that even the modern treaty was designed to foster relationships.62
The judgment of Deschamps J. in the Little Salmon case questions
whether the relationship-building understanding of treaties expressed by
the Aboriginal parties in the case — one closely fitting with what I have
called a covenantal conception — actually reflects a different understanding from that of the government lawyers arrayed against them. She
questions the oft-repeated claim that legal certainty is an objective of the
Crown only, saying that “[e]xcessive weight should not be given to the
arguments of the parties to this case, as their positions have clearly
become polarized as a result of the adversarial context of this proceeding.”63 She also suggests that “[i]t is also wrong, in my opinion, to say
that Aboriginal peoples’ relational understanding of the treaty is incompatible with the pursuit of the objective of legal certainty.”64 This
argument is fundamentally oriented toward broader objectives of
reconciliation rather than toward the case before the Court. It is an
unusual claim to suggest that parties’ own arguments should not be given
“excessive weight” in understanding what those parties seek. A judge
would not normally accuse specific parties of this sort of false consciousness. However, Deschamps J. is predominantly concerned with the
long-term implications of different understandings of treaty negotiation
and worries that adversarial proceedings have distracted from this longerterm objective presumably shared by all.
It may be true that there is less incompatibility than one might presume as between relational understandings of treaties (those seeing them
as concerned with establishing the foundational relationships between the
parties, or forming the covenant between the parties, in my terminology)
and understandings of treaties as oriented to establishing legal certainty.
There are certainly dangers of creating false dichotomies as between
Aboriginal and Western worldviews. However, it is also a mistake to
62
Several portions of the oral argument, accessible on the Supreme Court of Canada website at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/cms-sgd/webcast-webdiffusion-eng.aspx?cas=32850>
are illuminating on this point. The argument for the respondent from Jean Teillet at 1:57:00 to
2:01:00 of the webcast frames the factual context from a First Nation perspective, reiterated by
Arthur Pape throughout his continuation of the argument from 2:15:00 onward. A particularly
powerful argument on behalf of the intervener Te’mexw Nations is offered by Robert Janes at
5:24:00 to 5:34:00 of the webcast, with an explicit argument against analogizing treaties to
commercial agreements and an argument concerning the effects on First Nation participation in
modern treaty negotiations if they are taken that way.
63
Little Salmon, supra, note 8, at para. 110.
64
Id., at para. 111.
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override the genuine differences between different conceptualizations of
treaties. Where there are ambiguities, contractual interpretation may be
ready to fill these ambiguities with what is reasonable in light of the
objectives of the parties. The alternative conceptualization of treaties as
covenants between peoples or communities may actually open more
appropriately the possibility of different interpretations oriented to longterm reconciliation between the parties. This phrasing may sound like a
mere nuance and splitting of hairs, especially because an appropriately
rich conceptualization of the contractual purposes of the parties could
shift toward it, but if there is a difference between contractual texts and
constitutional texts, there is equally a difference between analogizing
treaties to contracts and analogizing treaties to covenants between
communities.
This drawing of distinctions and allegation of potential effects will
strike some as pedantic or perhaps even hyperbole-laden. But one of the
fundamental principles of interpretation is that the uniqueness of the
object to be interpreted is pertinent to the application of interpretive
principles. Chief Justice Dickson memorably adopted into Canadian
constitutionalism Paul Freund’s precept on the need to avoid “read[ing] the
provisions of the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become
one”.65 In a recent book on interpretation, Aharon Barak, former Chief
Justice of Israel, both recognizes the common principles applicable as
between the interpretation of wills, contracts, statutes and constitutions and
distinguishes between the areas of their uniqueness, with constitutions
notably unique because of the way in which they “guide human behavior
over an extended period of time”.66 Modern treaties have guided the
relationship between communities thus far over a shorter period of time
than historic treaties but are obviously intended to have the same duration.
It is, on my argument, important to recognize their uniqueness, distinct
from that of a contract. To read them explicitly like contracts will bring
some pertinent principles to bear but risks making them into mere contracts, thereby taking away from the contribution they can make to longterm relationships and mutually flourishing communities.

65
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Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.).
Barak, supra, note 29, at 370.
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IV. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTRACTUAL
ELEMENTS IN THE RECENT CASES
Those elements of the judgments drawing the contractual analogy in
the present cases are neither arbitrary nor malicious. They reflect, first, a
genuine attempt to come to grips with the significantly different nature of
the modern treaty text. As noted earlier, Binnie J. rightly emphasizes that
“[t]he text of modern comprehensive treaties is meticulously negotiated
by well-resourced parties.”67 To fail to respect the text would do harm to
the serious efforts underlying it. These elements of the judgments reflect,
second, a genuine desire to further processes of collaboration. Even if
there is some reason to have concerns about parts of Deschamps J.’s
framing of her argument, as outlined above, there is no reason to doubt
the sincerity of her concern for the fate of First Nations in the absence of
clear treaties, which she outlines as follows:
In fact, according to studies commissioned by the United Nations,
(1) lack of precision with respect to their special rights continues to be
the most serious problem faced by Aboriginal peoples, and (2)
Aboriginal peoples attach capital importance to the conclusion of
treaties with the Crown (M. Saint-Hilaire, “La proposition d’entente de
principe avec les Innus: vers une nouvelle génération de traités?”
(2003), 44 C. de D. 395, at pp. 397-98).68

Justice Deschamps’ argument is partly consonant with Jai’s argument
that interpretation of modern treaties in a manner deferential to the
treaties’ texts and thus promoting certainty and finality will nurture a
strong, ongoing treaty process, as well as Jai’s further argument that an
approach not doing so will discourage further treaty-making.69
These allusions to treaty-making incentives are not inherently wrong,
for a consideration of some of the underlying dynamics of relationshipbuilding is inherently important.70 But their instrumentalist orientation
must surely be paired with other considerations, or there are arguably
significant, farther-reaching implications. For instance, there has begun
to emerge a new literature on Aboriginal rights questions that is framed
in law-and-economics terms. Queen’s law professor Cherie Metcalf has
67

Moses, supra, note 7, at para. 7.
Little Salmon, supra, note 8, at para. 111.
69
Jai, supra, note 6, at 59-62.
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Cf. also generally Shin Imai, “Creating Disincentives to Negotiate: Mitchell v. M.N.R.’s
Potential Effect on Dispute Resolution” (2003) 22 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 309.
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begun an innovative task of economic description of Aboriginal law,71
McGill political theorist Jacob Levy has used some law-and-economics
arguments more prescriptively,72 and Calgary political scientist Tom
Flanagan has developed a widely discussed reform project for Aboriginal
property holding that has economic roots.73 The development of this
literature is important and responds to what was previously a serious gap
in approaches. The lessons of private law and, indeed, of free markets
have much potential in contributing to the fuller flourishing of Aboriginal
communities. However, an interpretation of treaties based on overly
instrumentalist values would arguably implicitly authorize a completely
thorough-going instrumentalism that even this new literature would not
claim. A careful balancing of instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist
considerations is surely the healthier course.
Approaching even modern treaties as covenants establishing the
foundational terms of longer-term relationships does not, to be clear,
mean ignoring the text of those treaties. Indeed, there should be ample
respect for clear terms over which the parties have negotiated at length
and with the aim of finding mutually respectful terms of relationship.
However, there is still a different emphasis present in interpreting them
covenantally rather than contractually. The spirit in which judges
approach ambiguous terms is different when thinking of what will make
the treaties the instruments of cooperation between communities than
when approaching them with a spirit of rushing to apply technical
doctrines like expressio unius or contra proferentem. To say this much is
not to say that the principles these latter doctrines embody are not
relevant. But it is to say that it is meaningfully different to start with a
mindset related to contracts as opposed to a mindset related to covenants
by which communities will live and flourish together.

71
See, e.g., Cherie Metcalf, “Compensation as Discipline in the Justified Limitation of
Aboriginal Rights: The Case of Forest Exploitation” (2008) 33 Queen’s L.J. 385. See also Ian Keay
& Cherie Metcalf, “Aboriginal Rights, Customary Law and the Economics of Renewable Resource
Exploitation” (2004) 30 Can. Pub. Pol’y 1. Keay and Metcalf have also been working on a paper,
potentially the first of several, assessing the economic effects of leading Aboriginal title cases on
long-term growth.
72
See Jacob T. Levy, “Three Perversities of Indian Law” (2008) 12 Texas Rev. L. & Pols.
329.
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Tom Flanagan, Beyond the Indian Act: Restoring Aboriginal Property Rights (Montreal:
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These questions of interpretation, I might add, are important precisely because the Moses and Little Salmon cases will not be the last
modern treaty cases. Indeed, they reflect just the beginning of what will
no doubt be a series of questions arising as to the meaning of various
treaty provisions, whether to be faced by the parties through further
negotiation, by counsel to various individuals and communities affected,
or by the courts in the context of disputes brought to them.

V. THE ONGOING ROOM FOR COVENANTAL INTERPRETATION
Although the recent judgments emphasize the contractual analogy in
a number of places, and that analogy perhaps partly defines their emphasis on text, the reasons in the judgments discussed above do not foreclose
all possibility of ongoing covenantal interpretations of treaties. Indeed,
when confronted with the starker possibilities of contractual interpretation in Little Salmon, Binnie J. is ready to back off from commercial
readings, and he writes that “as the facts of this case show, the treaty will
not accomplish its purpose if it is interpreted by territorial officials in an
ungenerous manner or as if it were an everyday commercial contract.
The treaty is as much about building relationships as it is about the
settlement of ancient grievances.”74
The modern treaty as covenant has a different nature than the historical treaty as covenant, but the modern treaty as covenant also has a
different nature than the modern treaty as contract. The ongoing pull
between these normative possibilities will affect what kind of reconciliation the Court’s push toward negotiation establishes. The full story of
modern treaty interpretation remains only partly written, and future
judges will add chapters to those that have been set down in powerful
forms in the Moses and Little Salmon cases. May they write these future
chapters with sagacity, humility and respect for all that is at stake.
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Little Salmon, supra, note 8, at para. 10.

